Can we secure Plato’s case for the tripartite soul?

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0.1 Abstract

Plato’s suite of arguments for distinguishing between reason, appetite and spirit as three separate sources of motivation within a single soul, are essential to his case for the tripartite soul at Republic IV. Issues concerning the plausibility of this case arise from the rival interpretations of these arguments. Equally, problems with this account’s credibility emerge from the possibility that Plato is not truly devoted to the soul’s tripartition, either in the later books of the Republic, or in the dialogues post-dating the Republic. The project of this paper is to demonstrate that we can secure Plato’s case for the tripartite soul, on the grounds that it is firstly, internally consistent and secondly, that Plato is genuinely committed to this account of the soul both throughout his middle dialogues, and within the Republic itself.

0.2 Introduction

Before answering the title question, it will be beneficial to address Plato’s motivation for the tripartite soul at Rep IV. At 434d, Socrates establishes a macrocosm of political justice as the three producing, guarding and ruling classes each doing their own work in the ideal political state (Republic, IV, 434d). Yet, only once the form of justice in the city is shown to be structurally identical to the form of justice in the individual soul, can Socrates accept that his guest speakers and he have established what justice is (434d).

Plato’s tripartite soul serves to establish three parts in a single soul; the reasoning part, which drives a person to form desires for knowledge, the appetitive part, which develops his desires for bodily appetites, and the spirited part which motivates him to emotions such as anger (436a-b). While the case for tripartition may be interpreted as a single complex argument, I read it as a suite of three separate arguments. Namely, Socrates’s first tripartition argument demarcates reason from appetite (439d). The conclusion of this argument identifies reason as the part which is responsible for our rational motivations and appetite as the part which drives our pursuit of bodily appetites. His second tripartition argument distinguishes spirit from appetite (440e), while the third and final tripartition argument separates spirit from reason (441b). The conclusions of the latter two arguments taken together distinguish spirit as a third soul part. These three arguments formulate the case for tripartition, which confirms that the same number and types of classes as are in the city are also in the individual soul (441b). On this basis, at 441d, Socrates recognises that the structural similarity of justice in
the city and soul follows (Blossner, 2007, p.348). He recalls that justice in the city involves each of the three classes doing their own job; analogously, when the reasoning, appetitive and spirited parts each do their own work in the individual, his soul is just (441d-e). This involves spirit allying itself with and executing reason’s desire to govern each part and the whole soul (441e), while appetite pursues satisfaction of only those appetites that are necessary for the body to function (442a). By establishing a microcosm of justice in the individual, the tripartite soul contributes to one of Rep IV’s fundamental goals, that is, to determine the nature of justice (444a).

Though securing Plato’s case for the tripartite soul could involve addressing various grounds of its plausibility, it is crucial to present its arguments as being internally consistent. To this end, the first two chapters shall constitute the interpretive body of this paper, where I will tease out the most plausible interpretation of the arguments that construct the tripartite soul. In chapter one, I will defend Plato’s demarcation of reason from appetite, in the first section by showing that its central principle, the ‘P of O’, can be successfully established. This will allow the principle to identify the thirsty man who is simultaneously averse to drinking, as providing the relevant pair of incompatible desires that underpin the argument’s case of psychological conflict. Yet, rival characterisations of these desires can prevent ‘thirst’ and ‘being unwilling to drink’ from instantiating the ‘P of O’. The second section of this chapter will embark on a plausible characterisation of these desires, so that they instantiate the principle and allow the argument for the reasoning and appetitive soul parts which correspond to them, to run through. When construed as representations of the same object, each arrived at by a distinct evaluative source, reason and appetite will constitute conflicting sources of motivation in a single soul. It shall appear possible to maintain that this tripartition argument establishes reason and appetite as distinct soul parts.

In chapter two, I will secure Plato’s distinction of spirit from appetite and reason. In the first section, this shall involve interpreting Socrates’s second and third tripartition arguments in a way that successfully establishes each of their conclusions- in the first case, that spirit is different from appetite, and in the second, that spirit is distinct from reason. Still, I must establish the nature of spirit that is necessary for Plato’s inference from the conclusions of these arguments, to spirit as a third soul part, to run through. When construed as a representational statement that is sought by an evaluative source distinct from reason and appetite, spirit will emerge as a third soul part.
At the end of these two chapters, I shall provide a summary which confirms reason, appetite and spirit as separate soul parts that each correspond to a distinct source of motivation, arrived at by a particular system of evaluation. Establishing the three soul parts will produce the first ground for securing Plato’s tripartite soul, namely, its internal consistency.

Once I have confirmed the tripartite soul’s internal consistency, this shall naturally lead me at chapter 3 to consider whether we can further secure Plato’s case for the tripartite soul, by examining his commitment to tripartition. In the first section of this chapter this will involve determining whether Plato intends a serious psychology by the soul’s three parts, through showing that Socrates interprets the project of self-examination as a search for inconsistency between our soul parts, rather than our beliefs regarding correct action. A second way Plato will appear genuinely committed to the tripartite soul requires demonstrating the coherence of tripartition with his wider scheme of the soul both in dialogues post-dating the Republic, and within the later books of the Republic itself. This shall involve observing the three-part soul both in Phaedrus, Phaedo and Republic X’s account of the soul’s immortality, as well as in pictorial summaries of the just soul in the Republic’s later books.

Chapter 1: Demarcating reason from appetite

I shall present Plato’s first tripartition argument, which demarcates appetite from reason. Then, I shall split the chapter into two parts, firstly, establishing the argument’s ‘P of O’ (Stalley, 1975, p.110). This shall include discerning the sense of opposition which it uses, first, by offering a plausible interpretation of the English translation ‘with regard to the same’ from Plato’s original Greek (Ibid., p.112) as it occurs within the ‘P of O’. Secondly, I will consider whether this principle’s notion of opposition should accommodate Plato’s discussion of opposition in the Phaedo. I shall conclude that the ‘P of O’ can be successfully grounded, and thus can diagnose the thirsty man who is unwilling to drink as a case of psychological conflict. Then, I will examine whether Plato provides a sufficient account of these desires, so that they instantiate the ‘P of O’ and allow his inference to the reasoning and appetitive parts to run through. The characterisation of appetite and reason-based desires that is required by his argument will be as distinct evaluative representations of an object. Yet, this account will provoke a tension concerning whether there is a more psychologically plausible explanation of our action in the face of conflicting desires, that does not require the separate soul parts. Nonetheless, I shall resolve this tension by emphasising Plato’s case of motivational conflict
as involving simultaneous desire and aversion to a given object—each which must be attributed to a separate soul part. I will conclude that we can establish Plato’s first tripartition argument, and thus allow the demarcation of the reasoning and appetitive parts, to run through.

The first tripartition argument can be construed as:

(1) The Principle of Opposites: it is evident that the same thing will not be willing to be, do or undergo opposites in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, at the same time (436b-c).
(2) Assent and dissent, desiring something and being averse to that thing, and taking something and pushing it away, are pairs of opposites (437b).
(3) When someone has an appetite for a thing and desires the object of that appetite, his not having an appetite for this thing and pushing it away, is the opposite (437c).
(4) Thirst is an appetite (437d).
(5) Thirst qua thirst will never be for anything other than its natural object, namely, drink itself (437e).
(6) Therefore the soul of a thirsty person, inasmuch as he is thirsty, desires nothing above drink itself, and is impelled to satisfy this desire (439a-439b).
(7) (Following the ‘P of O’) If something causes the soul of a thirsty person to be averse to drink, this must be a different thing from that which drives this soul to drink (439b).
(8) Sometimes thirsty men are unwilling to drink (439c).
(9) Therefore, there is in the soul of a thirsty man who is unwilling to drink something summoning him to drink, and something else in the soul which, overriding this desire, forbids him from drinking (439c).

(10) That in the soul which forbids is a result of rational calculation, while the thing driving the man to drink follows his passions and diseases (439c-d).

(Conclusion) There are two parts of the soul; the part with which the soul calculates is the rational part, while the part which is stimulated by bodily appetites is the irrational, appetitive part (439d).

1.1 The Principle of Opposites
Arguably, discerning the correct sense of opposition used by the ‘P of O’ is crucial to establish this principle. Only once this principle is grounded, can it identify the relevant conflicting desires at (8) as providing this tripartition argument with a case of psychological conflict. One way of clarifying this opposition is by discerning the correct interpretation of the English translation ‘with regard to the same’ from the original Greek statement of the ‘P of O’ (Stalley, op. cit., p.112). While most English translators render ‘with regard to the same’ as ‘in the same part’, the meaning of this interpretation remains vague: it could mean ‘in the same way’, or even ‘concerning the same matter’ (Ibid., p.113). When used within the ‘P of O’, each translation would thus bare a slightly different sense of opposition. Despite this flexibility of translation, I endorse Stalley’s understanding of Plato, as having meant by this phrase ‘in the same respect’ (Ibid.). This clarifies the relevant sense of opposition for the ‘P of O’ as two terms that are opposite ends within the same general kind of activity (Ibid.).

Arguably, this reading of ‘in the same part’ has interpretive merit, given that Plato rules out a case of opposition which is not affected within the same sphere of activity, as an effective counterexample to the ‘P of O’ - namely, the revolving ‘spinning top’ (436d-e). He diagnoses this example as involving two different kinds of motion: firstly, motion which affects the top’s axis and causes it to incline or wobble. Given that the peg is fixed, the top is resting with respect to this type of motion. Secondly, there is motion which affects the top’s curved surface and sends it around in circles. When the top revolves, it is moving with respect to this second kind of motion. Insofar as the top’s movement involves two different kinds of motion, this does not qualify as a pair of opposites being affected ‘in the same respect’ (Lorenz, 2006, p.24). In rejecting this case as an appropriate objection to the ‘P of O’, Plato can be read as operating with the notion of opposition that is meant by Stalley’s translation of ‘in the same respect’ (Stalley, op. cit., p.113).

However, there is another qualification of opposition that Plato describes in the Phaedo (Stalley, 1975, p.120). It is natural to think that for the ‘P of O’ to be operating with a coherent notion of opposition, it should accommodate his broader discussion of this topic. In this dialogue, he defines opposition as the incompatibility of two terms within a pair of opposites (Ibid., p.121). At 102d, when discussing the members of the opposite pair ‘greatness’ and ‘smallness’, Plato asserts: only one of these two members can occur. He considers largeness: it either “flees” or “withdraws” when smallness comes towards it, or its existence has already ceased by the time this other member of the pair approaches it (102d-e). We can infer from this that, for Plato, opposition requires that two members of an opposite
pair are mutually incompatible. Perhaps a coherent notion of opposition used by the ‘P of O’ should address pairs that are mutually incompatible within the same collective class.

Plato clearly intends this notion of opposition by the ‘P of O’, given that the example of the thirsty man who is unwilling to drink which this principle later identifies, involves members that are opposite ends within the same general attitudes towards drinking, which are mutually incompatible. The thirsty man can have at once both a positive attitude and negative attitude towards drinking (Stalley, op. cit., p.119). But he cannot simultaneously seek the drink and refuse it. Given that this clearly exemplifies the Phaedo’s ‘mutual incompatibility’ requirement, the notion of opposition that Plato works with in the ‘P of O’ clearly accommodates his wider conception of opposition. In turn, it becomes clear that the sense of opposition required by the ‘P of O’ concerns two terms that are opposite ends within the same general sphere of activity, whose simultaneous satisfactions are mutually incompatible (Ibid., p122). Given that a clear sense of opposition emerges from Stalley’s ‘in the same respect’ interpretation of ‘with regard to the same’ in the ‘P of O’ (Ibid., p.112), along with considerations of Plato’s discussion of opposition outside of the Republic, we have grounds for establishing this principle. The ‘P of O’ is thus capable of diagnosing ‘thirst’ and ‘being unwilling to drink’ as a pair of conflicting desires that provide Plato with a substantial case of psychological conflict.

1.2 How do we characterise the conflicting desires?

Nonetheless, there are rival interpretations of how to characterise these conflicting desires. A correct understanding is crucial in determining whether these desires instantiate the ‘P of O’, to allow the argument for their corresponding reasoning and appetitive soul parts to run through. Perhaps Plato assimilates the relation of conflicting desires to the psychological opposition involved between ‘assent’ and ‘dissent’. Bobonich (cited in Stalley, 2007, p.75) understands the thirsty man's conflicting desires at 439c in this way. Plato asserts that, in the soul of a thirsty person who is unwilling to drink, there is something that bids them to drink, and something which forbids them from drinking (439c). Bobonich takes this passage to imply that both ‘thirst’ and ‘being unwilling to drink’ are desires each with their own conceptual content, and which enter into interactions with the other by virtue of this content. This content-based communication between desires clearly emulates the interaction between the conflicting psychological states of both assenting to and dissenting from a given object (Stalley, op. cit., pp.75-76).
Yet, there are some implications of the psychological opposition between ‘assent’ and ‘dissent’ which do not cohere with the activity of the parts that are characterised by Plato’s conflicting desires. For instance, content-based interaction would create the possibility of each desire changing on the basis of new information, namely, information that is provided by communicating with the content of the other part’s desire (Ibid., p.76). However, when Plato describes the alliance of reason and spirit, they govern appetite to see that it does not become as powerful as to try and overrule the whole soul (442a). While this governing can redirect appetite’s desires so that they become aligned with reason and spirit’s goal to guard the soul, they cannot be fundamentally morphed to replicate the desires of these two parts. The content-based communication this characterisation implies does not mirror Plato’s description of the interaction between the three soul parts. What is more, at 437c, Socrates refers to assent and dissent to address the soul’s activity; suggesting that the soul of a person who desires a given thing, “nods assent” (437c) to that thing. Given that he explicitly describes the whole soul as assenting towards a given desire’s object (Stalley, Ibid.), we are hardly justified in thinking that the psychological opposition that emerges between assent and dissent provides an adequate picture of the conflicting desires that are characteristic of the soul’s parts.

Alternatively, we may understand ‘thirst’ and ‘being unwilling to drink’ as an agent’s motivational representations that are incompatible. Namely, Irwin would present the thirsty man’s aversion to drinking as a representation of the drink, namely, ‘drinking is bad’, which motivates his refusal to pursue the drink. He would characterise this desire as being ‘good-dependent’ (Irwin, 1977, p.192); it is influenced by beliefs both about what would be good for each part of the soul, and for the soul as a whole (Ibid., p.195). Perhaps the drink Plato has in mind is a poisonous one. The man’s representation ‘drink is bad’ would thus be a result of the belief that having this drink, say, would not be pleasant (and so would not satisfy the appetitive part of his soul), would result in ill-health, and so would not benefit the whole soul (insofar as spirit could not focus on enforcing reason’s goal to direct each part and the whole soul towards pursuing knowledge of the true good).

‘Being unwilling to drink’ is a desire that proceeds from the agent’s beliefs about the good; Irwin would diagnose his ‘thirst’ as the desire which conflicts with it, as good-independent (Ibid., p.192). He would characterise this desire as the representation: ‘drinking is pleasant’, which motivates the man’s pursuit of the drink. This desire does not represent the drink as good in any way; it follows a biological impulse (Ibid., p.193) that perceives the drink as pleasurable in some sense. Perhaps the drink is the thirsty man’s favourite- say,
vimto- and thirst follows his apprehension that the experience of ‘vimtoness’ would be pleasant. Consequentially, he is driven to pursue his thirst. It is worth noting that, while this representation only apprehends the pleasantness of the drink, this is not to say that the drink is not actually good for the man; it may rehydrate him. But the man’s desire expresses no evaluation of such good; it merely motivates him towards drink qua pleasant. Since this representation explains ‘thirst’ without any reference to the man’s good (Ibid.), Irwin would characterise this desire as entirely independent of beliefs about the good. (Ibid., p.192). The resulting picture presents ‘thirst’ and ‘being unwilling to drink’ as two representations which motivate the thirsty man to act in opposite ways that he cannot simultaneously pursue; having the drink, and refusing it. Irwin’s treatment of the example thus provides a pair of opposite desires within the same general class of ‘attitudes towards drinking’ which can instantiate the ‘P of O’, and allow Plato’s inference to the appetitive and reasoning parts within the soul which correspond to these conflicting desires, to run through.

Nonetheless, characterised as motivational representations, these desires are not suitably conflicting. ‘Thirst’ represents the drink as pleasant; ‘being unwilling to drink’ represents it as bad. Yet, the two are not incompatible; the thirsty man’s aversion to drinking may be influenced by the belief that, say, a poisonous drink disguised as vimto would not be beneficial to him, insofar as it is not conducive to health. Yet, he may still desire the drink, insofar as he acknowledges that the experience of the ‘vimtoness’ itself would be pleasant. The thirsty man can retain both desires, and still choose to avoid drinking. Hence, ‘thirst’ and ‘being unwilling to drink’ are not two desires that leave the thirsty man conflicted about how to act- which are needed to instantiate the ‘P of O’, and allow Plato’s inference to reason and appetite, to succeed.

Perhaps a characterisation of ‘thirst’ and ‘being unwilling to drink’ that allows the ‘P of O’ to run through represents these desires as having conflicting content, in virtue of the fact that each representation is arrived at by a distinct source of evaluation. In a similar fashion to Irwin, Moss would analyse ‘being unwilling to drink’ as a representation of the drink as ‘drinking is bad’. However, Moss would identify this representation as the result of a distinct process of evaluation. This aversion arises from a system of rational calculation (Moss, 2006, p.517), where such calculation involves measurement of what is truly best (Ibid) for each part and for the whole soul. Presented with, say, a poisonous drink, this system would measure: the harm that would result in the appetitive part (the drink’s physical damage would stunt this part’s pursuit of other bodily desires), the reasoning part (the resulting ill-heath would distract this part’s goal to regulate the activity of the other soul
parts), the spirited part (this part could not enforce reason’s goal, which is itself distracted), as well as the long-term damage that would result for the whole soul (the parts, harmed by the poison, would not communicate cooperatively, as required for the soul to pursue knowledge of the true good). The desire to avoid drink is thus generated by this system of calculation (Ibid., p.527), whose measuring capacity allows it to evaluate what is in fact good for the soul of the thirsty man (Ibid., p.529).

Accordingly, Moss would represent ‘thirst’ as ‘drinking is good’- where this statement is evaluated by a source different from that which motivates the thirsty man’s refusal to drink. She would affirm that this desire is arrived at by a system of appearances (Ibid., p.528), which evaluates the drink as ‘good’. By this system, vimto appears pleasant to the thirsty man; since what seems pleasant appears to him to be good, he desires drink *qua* good. Yet, this system of appearances cannot identify what is truly good above what is merely apparently good; the thirsty man evaluates drink as good according to appearances (Ibid.).

Still, this analysis of apparent goodness does not figure in the content of the representation itself. It is not that the drink is valued with regard to its appearances, but rather that its value is sought through the apparatus of appearances. Arguably, the characterisation of ‘thirst’ based on the evaluative sources of appearances offers an account of appetitive desires that is consistent throughout the Republic. For instance, the oligarchic man’s appetitive desire for wealth (*Republic*, VIII, 553c) is confirmed by the system of appearances which announces money and property as apparent goods, insofar as he recognises that their possession is pleasant. A picture of appetite’s desires as cognitively limited to the realm of appearances is thus confirmed by the Republic.

Given that ‘thirst’ is generated by a system that presents illusions of what is truly good, the thirsty man continues to desire the vimto drink as pleasant- despite the system of rational calculation which recognises it as poisonous (Moss, op. cit.). Effectively, ‘thirst’ and ‘being unwilling to drink’ present the conflicting representations ‘drinking is good’ and ‘drinking is bad’ that result from two different evaluative processes. The former motivates the thirsty man to pursue the drink, while the latter motivates him to refuse it. Yet, he cannot satisfy both. Moss’ picture thus presents a pair of genuinely conflicting desires within the general realm of attitudes towards drinking, which can instantiate the ‘P of O’. Consequently, the inference to reason and appetite as the subjects of these desires at (11) remains intact.

However, this analysis of ‘thirst’ and ‘being unwilling to drink’ may create a picture of conflicting desires towards the drink which can be resolved without ascribing a simultaneous desire and aversion to this object. We can imagine such a case by presenting a
conflict of desires within a single soul part, namely, appetite. If a person is presented with a
drink which he strongly dislikes—say, iron bru—this drink would be announced ‘bad’ by his
system of appearances. He would develop a desire to avoid drinking, given that its pursuit
would be, say, unpleasant, and so, ‘bad’ for him. Yet, this very system may simultaneously
confirm the drink as being ‘good’, given that it recognises the satisfaction of thirst as itself
pleasant. Since what is pleasant appears good to him (Moss, op. cit.), he would form the
corresponding desire for the drink. Here, the thirsty man has a simultaneous desire to avoid
the drink, and a desire to satisfy his thirst—both arrived at by appetite’s system of
appearances, and both which cannot be concurrently satisfied. Instead of reaching a
stalemate, perhaps he evaluates the strength of each desire, and acts on the basis of the
stronger desire. For instance, if he is exceptionally thirsty, his desire for thirst-satisfaction
will outweigh his desire to avoid the ‘iron-bru experience’, motivating his pursuit of the
drink. But if this explains motivational conflict within a single soul part, what is to say that
the explanation is not the same in the case of the conflict between the reasoning and
appetitive soul parts? Maybe the thirsty man at 439c faces two desires: one, say, to pursue the
drink, given that his system of appearances (Moss, op. cit., p.528) announces the drink as
pleasant to him— and another, to pursue his education in philosophy, given that his system of
calculation confirms that this would be best for him. In order to avoid a standstill, he ranks
the strength of each desire, and acts according to that which is stronger. Once he acts on one
of these desires, he no longer suffers a conflict of motivation between acting on one desire
over the other. So far, this analysis is plausible, given that it does not violate the ‘Պ of Օ’; as
soon as he reaches a verdict, the thirsty man is no longer conflicted by two desires that would
lead him to act in opposite ways, in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, at the
same time (Republic, IV, 436b).

Yet, neither does this counter instance establish the ‘Պ of Օ’, for it provides no
relevant pair of conflicting desires towards the same thing, to instantiate this principle.
Clearly, the relevant case of motivational conflict for Plato concerns a desire and aversion to
the same thing. That is, his example of the thirsty man discusses the man’s being “drawn
back” and his being driven “like a beast” to one and the same thing; drink (439b). To analyse
the thirsty man as facing various unrelated desires which he chooses between in order to act,
does not reflect Plato’s agenda of explaining the conflicting desires relative to a single object.
This tension is avoidable, by emphasising Plato’s concern with motivational conflict as the
simultaneous desire and aversion to a single object. We can maintain Moss’ would-be
analysis of the thirsty man as having desires that are relevantly conflicted, and so which
instantiate the ‘P of O’. On this account, Plato’s inference to reason and appetite as responsible for these desires succeeds.

1.3- a conclusion

Though we can readily demonstrate the first tripartition argument as demarcating reason from appetite, it is crucial to establish the ‘P of O’ in order for the thirsty man’s desire and aversion to drinking to present a pair of conflicting desires that qualify as a case of psychological conflict. This seems possible by clarifying the sense of opposition used by this principle, which involves first interpreting its use of ‘with regard to the same’ as ‘in the same respect’ (Stalley, op. cit., p.112), and secondly, considering Plato’s discussion of opposition outside of the Republic. Yet, once this principle is established, there remain rival interpretations concerning the nature of these conflicting desires, which prevent them from instantiating the ‘P of O’, and from allowing Plato’s inference to appetite and reason to run through. Once we adopt Moss’ would-be analysis of ‘thirst’ and ‘being unwilling to drink’ as representations of the same object, each sought by a distinct process of evaluation, the result is a pair of conflicting desires which cannot be concurrently satisfied, and so which instantiate the ‘P of O’. However, there arises a tension from this analysis; there may be a more psychologically plausible explanation of action in the face of conflicting appetitive desires that are arrived at by these systems of evaluation. Yet, this tension appears resolvable once we emphasize that Plato’s relevant case of motivational conflict concerns a simultaneous desire and aversion to a single object, which cannot be concurrently satisfied. We can thus defend Moss’ characterisation of the conflicting desires as ‘drinking is good’ and ‘drinking is bad’ as genuinely instantiating the ‘P of O’, and as allowing the inference to appetite and reason as the subjects of these desires, to succeed. To this extent, we can maintain that the first tripartition argument successfully establishes reason and appetite as separate soul parts.

Chapter 2: demarcating spirit from appetite and reason

Socrates proceeds from demarcating reason from appetite in the soul by asking Glaucon whether the spirited part by which we get angry is a distinct part of the soul, or whether it shares the same nature as either of these other two parts (439e). I shall present each of the final two of Plato’s three tripartition arguments. Then, I shall establish the characterisation of spirit that is required for Plato’s inference from the conclusions of these arguments, to the case for spirit as a third soul part, to run through. This will involve
determining the two functions of spirit which correspond to the appetitive souls that the individual must face (Brennan, 2012, p.105). Spirit will emerge as a distinct source of motivation that aims to regulate appetite’s desires in line with reason’s conduct. To this extent, I will confirm that the conclusions of the second and third tripartition arguments together successfully establish spirit as a third soul part.

The second tripartition argument constitutes different cases that demonstrate spirit as different in nature from appetite, and concludes by distinguishing spirit from appetite. Socrates’s first case describes the tale of Leontius, who was travelling up from Piraeus when he saw some corpses lying at an executioner’s feet. He forms the appetitive desire to glare at, and the simultaneous repulsion towards looking at, the dead bodies (439e). He is reluctant to gaze at the persecuted bodies outside of the temple of Dionysius, on the grounds that this punishment of criminal offenders by the roadside is not appropriate. He calculates that it is a shameful and disreputable thing to gaze upon the corpses (Ferrari, 2007, p.181). Despite resisting his gaze for a while, Leontius becomes overpowered by his appetite. His desire to peer at the corpses prevails, and forces his eyes to gorge on the scene. He scorns himself; ordering his eyes to take their fill of the “beautiful sight” (439e-440a). His spirit’s energy expresses repulsion when he becomes angry at himself for succumbing to his appetitive desire to gaze at the corpses (Liebert, 2013). His anger is directly related towards the mastery of his appetitive desires; Socrates takes this as proof that spirit sometimes “makes war” against the appetites (440a). The conflict that arises between spirit and appetite provides Plato with adequate grounds to infer that the two do not share the same nature, and on this basis, to conclude that spirit is not the same thing as appetite.

Socrates then presents the more general case of a person’s internal “civil war” (440b) to expose spirit as different from appetite. He observes that when a person’s appetite forces him to act against his reason, he often becomes angry at the part of him that does the forcing. Out of the two parts which conflict, spirit allies itself with reason. He fleshes out this claim with the example of a person who believes that someone has acted unjustly towards him. Fighting for what it takes to be just, the spirit within him, angry with rage, calls him to endure the punishment that he is not due. In refusing to cease from noble actions until it is called to stop by his reason, the spirited part aligns itself with the reasoning part (440c-d). It executes reason’s desire to pursue justice, where reason calculates how to correctly avenge someone who punishes you unjustly. Comparatively, Socrates points out to Glaucon that he can never claim to have witnessed spirit- either in him or another- to have collaborated with the
appetitive part in carrying out what reason has decided should not be done (440b). Spirit works alongside the reasoning part only, never with the appetitive part. This case confirms Socrates’s claim that spirit is different in nature from appetite; grounding his conclusion that spirit is not the same thing as appetite (441b).

Socrates reflects that the distinction of spirit from appetite in itself does not rule out the consistency of spirit with reason (440e). He sets about the distinction of spirit from the rational part (441a), which constitutes the third tripartition argument. This argument is formed of different cases that indicate spirit as different in nature from reason, and concludes by distinguishing spirit from reason. Socrates and Glaucons’ first two cases show that the spirited element in certain organisms does not co-vary with the strength of their rational elements (Crombie, 1962, p.97). Firstly, Glaucon speaks of small children, who have plenty of spirit from birth- but the majority of whose reason remains deficient for many years, and some whose reason does not develop at all (441a). Socrates then considers animals: their complete lack of rational calculation is heavily outweighed by the power of their spirit (441b). In both cases, the strength of the subject’s reason does not correlate with the strength of their spirit (Crombie, op. cit.); grounding Socrates’s claim that the former is different in nature from the latter. To this extent, he concludes that spirit is distinct from reason.

The tale of Odysseus cited at 441b provides a different case for demonstrating reason and spirit appear as different in nature. Odysseus is angry at his servant girls for sleeping with his suitors (Odyssey, XX). Nonetheless, his reason “struck his chest and spoke to his heart” (441b); rebuking his spirit from forcing him to take revenge. Although the offenders have brought upon Odysseus an unjust harm which they ought to be punished for, rational calculation informs him that it would better protect his status and reputation as King if he were to refrain from indulging in his anger. Given that the King’s spirited desire and rational aversion express opposite attitudes towards the same act of revenge, it seems natural to infer that these desires are different in nature. This grounds Socrates conclusion that the calculative part and the part that is angry without calculation which correspond to these desires, are distinct (441b).

2.1 How should we characterise spirit?

The second tripartition argument concludes that spirit is not the same thing as appetite; while the third tripartition argument concludes that spirit is not the same thing as reason. For Plato’s inference to spirit as a distinct third part of the soul to run through, we must offer a characterisation of spirit that fits these arguments.
One way of characterising spirit is in terms of the object which Socrates initially associates it with, namely, anger (439e). However, when we distinguish between two different senses of anger, the cases for spirit as distinct from reason and from appetite, fall apart. For instance, consider Socrates’s initial distinction of spirit from appetite, to the extent that spirit can only ally itself with reason (440b). This demarcation requires a restricted conception of anger, that is, one which involves the reasoning part’s calculation of what is a reasonable emotional response to the situation at hand. By this understanding, anger becomes ‘righteous indignation’ (Hardie, 1936, p.142). Yet, this sense causes Socrates’s case for distinguishing spirit from the reasoning part, to break down (Ibid.). An understanding of spirit which involves reason’s verdict of a justified emotional response, cannot explain the cases of young children and animals, who are full of spirit (441a), but in whom either very little or no rational calculation, is present (Hardie, op. cit.). Effectively, the account of spirit as anger in this limiting sense, causes Plato’s case for spirit as a distinct soul part to break down (Ibid., p.143).

On the other hand, recall Socrates’s distinction between spirit and reason, on the basis of individuals such as Odysseus, whose reason rebukes his spirited rage (Odyssey, XX). This distinction requires a ‘wide’ sense of anger (Hardie, op. cit., p.143), one which does not include reason’s calculations of what a reasonable emotional response to the maids’ and suitors’ transgressions, would look like. But this sense causes Socrates’s case for demarcating spirit from appetite, to fail. Illustrating spirit as a purely unreflective, instinctive response does nothing to qualify Odysseus’s chiding the men and women as anything more than the result of an appetitive impulse (Ibid.). When Socrates’s distinction of spirit from reason requires it to be understood as anger in this unrestricted way, this distinction breaks down (Ibid.). The distinctions of spirit from appetite and spirit from reason each break down on both a broad and more specific interpretation of anger. We thus cannot characterise spirit as the part by which we get angry, if Plato’s inference from the conclusions of the second and third tripartition arguments, to spirit as a third soul part, is to run through.

Rather than understanding spirit in terms of the anger which manifests it, perhaps we can characterise it as a motivational source that mediates between reason and appetite. One way of identifying this motivational source is by pinpointing the functions of spirit within the embodied soul. Arguably, these functions correspond to the appetites which this soul must face (Brennan, op. cit., p.105). For instance, as a social animal, the agent must confront the appetitive souls in the bodies of other people (Ibid.). Reason calculates that appetitive goods
are scarce in the world; this creates the need for a soul part which can negotiate with other soul’s competing appetites, to ensure the agent’s fair share of them (Ibid., p.107). Enter spirit, which exercises its role as external co-ordinator of an individual’s appetites (Ibid., p.125); defending against the threat of other appetitive souls who are prepared to take these possessions for their own satisfaction. We can read Plato as understanding spirit to involve this function (Ibid., p.106). Using his political allegory in Rep III, he assimilates the spirited part of the soul to the auxiliary class in his ideal state. Socrates asserts one of the jobs of this class as guarding “against external enemies” (414b), and at 415d he describes the auxiliaries’ search to set up camp, from where they can fend off outside enemies. Following the rules of analogy, we can interpret spirit’s post to defend an individual soul against the invasion of its appetitive possessions by the appetites of its fellow citizens.

An advantage of this account of spirit is that it can explain the objects which we typically associate with spirit. Namely, honour emerges from this function of spirit, when the system of honour is understood as the system for distributing appetitive goods between members of a community, in line with each member’s merit (Brennan, op. cit., p.105). In a place where such goods are limited, merit is originally based on one’s ability to obtain and protect these very goods (Ibid.,). Spirit thus aims at what is honourable when it seeks to distribute appetitive goods between individuals based on their performance in acquiring and retaining such goods. Evidently, this world of distributing and regulating appetitive goods is the very source of the system of honour (Ibid., pp.114). Spirit’s typical objects emerge once we can identify its function as an external defence-force (Ibid., p.125) in a world of competing appetites.

The second function of spirit corresponds to the competing appetites within an individual’s body (Ibid., p.106). For instance, I am tempted to pursue the many appetites which I am exposed to in this “realm of competing appetites” (Ibid. p.126). But the regulation of these appetites is essential if my soul parts are to communicate with one another harmoniously. This requires a part of my soul which can execute reason’s desires, to restrain me from overindulging my pursuit of bodily appetites (Ibid., p.106). Arguably, spirit, with its sense of self-esteem, can moderate my appetites (Ibid., p.119); it can exercise an internal, police-force type role (Ibid., p.106) within my soul. Arguably, Plato himself acknowledges this function of spirit. If we recall his use of the political allegory at 414b, the second job that Socrates ascribes to the auxiliary class is to guard against “internal friends”, so that they will no longer wish to harm the city (414b). Similarly, he describes the auxiliary class as setting up camp in a location from which they can “most easily control those within” (415d). Given
the structure of analogy, we can read Plato as assigning to spirit this job of guarding the whole soul against the overruling of appetite’s desires, by regulating those desires.

A picture of spirit as a motivation confirmed by a distinct evaluative source, emerges from these two functions. On both functions, a person’s drive to mediate between his appetite and reason (Ibid., p.126) is evaluated according to a system of competing appetites, where this system measures the appetites in a world of limited appetitive goods. On the external, defence-force function, spirit enforces reason’s desire to regulate our appetites (Ibid., p.125), where this regulation involves protecting our soul from the invasion of its appetites by other appetitive souls (Ibid., p.105). In its internal ‘police-force’ role (Ibid., p.125), spirit acts on reason’s desire to protect us from the competing appetites within our own body (Ibid., p.105). Effectively, spirit emerges as a motivation whose evaluative source is distinct from the ‘system of rational calculation’ and the ‘system of appearances’ which ground those motivations identified with reason and appetite. The inference that spirit is a distinct motivational source, from the conclusions of Plato’s second and third tripartition arguments, runs through.

Yet, this motivational source does not seem to explain the spirited young children at 441a. Their tendency to aggression is neither a calculated defence of their souls against external appetitive souls, nor a careful regulation of the appetites within their own souls. However, Plato may respond; this example is a manifestation of the motivation to mediate between appetite and reason, just at a stage prior to spirit’s training. What is displayed by someone who loves honour is what follows when these childlike impulses are trained in the correct way (Whiting, 2012, p.181). This training involves submitting these impulses to reason, with the result that they are cultivated to become reason-informed responses to other people’s appetitive desires, and to the appetitive desires within their own souls. These children will become people who love honour, because, in coming to terms with this world of competing appetites, their reason strives after the correct distribution of appetitive goods (Brennan, op. cit., p.105). On the proviso that these impulses are nurtured accordingly, they are genuine manifestations of spirit’s motivation to mediate between reason and appetite (Ibid., p125). This account of spirit remains established, given that the case of young children does not threaten it. It thus allows Plato’s inference to spirit as a third soul part to succeed.

2.2- A conclusion

Though we can easily present Plato’s second and third tripartition arguments, it is crucial to characterise spirit in a way that allows Plato’s inference to spirit as a third soul part,
to run through. This seems possible once we identify spirit as a source of motivation that is evaluated according to a system of competing appetites. On this account, spirit moves a person to regulate his appetites in accordance with reason’s verdict about the appropriate pursuit of such appetitive goods (Ibid., p.123). Yet, this motivation does not seem to offer an explanation of the uncalculated spirited outbursts of young children. We only need to describe the cultivation of spirit when it is trained alongside reason, to show that these children manifest an energy which shall one day be identified as their love for honour- when honour is understood as the correct distribution of appetitive goods (Ibid., p.105). On this account, we can still understand spirit as a distinct motivational source. The inference of spirit as a third soul part from the second and third tripartition arguments run through.

2.3 A summary: how the tripartition arguments work

The first tripartition argument qualifies a thirsty man’s desire for drink and aversion to drinking as opposite ends on a scale of attitudes towards drinking, which cannot both be satisfied. This presents a genuine case of motivational conflict in a single soul. The argument can explain this conflict by attributing each of the opposing desires to a separate motivational source, which is identified as a distinct soul part. Namely, the desire for drink is assigned to the appetitive part, which moves the soul to strive for what is good. In this part, goodness is evaluated according to a system of appearances, which includes the apparent goodness of satisfying bodily pleasures (Moss, op. cit., p.528). The aversion to drinking is ascribed to the reasoning part of the soul, which again motivates an agent to achieve what is good, but where this goodness is evaluated according to a system of rational calculation (Ibid., p.517). This system measures the genuine goodness that would benefit each part and the whole of the soul (Ibid.). The first tripartition argument concludes with a bifurcation of the soul into the reasoning and appetitive parts.

The second tripartition argument demonstrates that our spirited part cannot be identified with the appetitive part. Firstly, Socrates presents the example of Leontius, whose anger is directed at his appetitive part for overruling his aversion to look at the corpses (Republic, IV, 439e-440a). Then, he observes that when a person’s appetitive part forces him to act contrary to rational calculation, his spirited part allies itself with reason (440a-b). Given these two cases, it seems that the part by which we get angry is different in nature from the part that causes us to desire bodily pleasures. The argument concludes that spirit is not the same as appetite. Meanwhile, the third tripartition argument shows that spirit is not derived from the reasoning part of the soul. The argument trades on the examples of young children
and animals; both whose limited calculating abilities are outweighed by the strength of their spirit (441a-b). Socrates then cites the tale of Odysseus, whose reason and spirit are opposed about the same act of revenge. From these three cases, Socrates infers that our spirited energy must be different in nature from the reasoning part, and concludes the argument by denying that spirit is the same thing as reason. To allow the inference that spirit is a third soul part to run through from the conclusions of these arguments, we can read Plato’s characterisation of spirit as a motivational source that is evaluated according to a system of competing appetites (Brennan, op. cit.).

What emerges from these three arguments is a case for the tripartite soul that is internally consistent. The reasoning part explains our capacity to learn (436a), because it motivates us to pursue what is good according to a system of calculation that discerns what is truly good for each part and our whole soul (Moss, op. cit., p.517). The appetitive part explains our capacity to desire what is pleasurable (436a), given that it motivates us to achieve what is good, according to a system of appearances (Ibid.,p.528) that cannot detect goodness beyond the satisfaction of bodily appetites. The spirited part explains our capacity for anger (436a), because it moves us to mediate between appetite and reason, and expresses its frustration when it does not exercise this role successfully. No part can explain the motivational source or class of desires belonging to one of the other two parts. A person’s spirited part cannot explain his motivation to pursue bodily appetites, nor why he is moved to pursue knowledge; this part constitutes a separate motivation that is sought by a distinct process of evaluation. Even a soul whose spirit does not function properly is explainable by the fact that this part does not regulate the soul’s pursuit of appetitive desires according to reason’s verdict, as it should do. The three parts either interact as they should, or they do not. We can interpret the three tripartition arguments as creating a case for the tripartite soul that is internally consistent. To this extent, we have grounds to secure Plato’s case for the tripartite soul as presented in Republic 4.

Chapter 3- Is Plato truly committed to the tripartite soul?

A second angle from which we may secure Plato’s case for the tripartite soul is by demonstrating his genuine commitment to tripartition. To this end, I will firstly examine whether Plato intends a serious psychology by the tripartite soul. This shall involve addressing Plato’s pre-Republic project of self-examination (Rowe, 2007, p.122), where reference to the Apology shall lead us to diagnose a person’s intellectual errors at the level of
his beliefs (Ibid., p.171), rather than at the level of particular parts of his soul. Nonetheless, I will indicate that Socrates discards this pre-Republic analysis- since it does not provide an explanation of the actual phenomena in an embodied human soul- and offers tripartition to create a more accurate picture of motivational conflict. Secondly, I will investigate whether the tripartite soul is consistent with Plato’s wider discussion of the soul outside of and within the Republic. This will involve discussing the account of the soul’s immortality throughout the Phaedrus and Phaedo, where co-operation of the three parts of the embodied soul is crucial to ensure that it qualifies as immortal. Even from Rep X’s perspective of the soul in its true state, its immortality shall require a fundamental unity of the reasoning, appetitive and spirited parts, when the soul is joined to the body. Meanwhile, the education of the soul at Rep VII, and the unjust man at Rep IX, will appear to provide pictorial summaries of the account of justice offered by tripartition. It shall seem natural to read the three-part soul emerging from these examples as confirming Plato’s analysis of human psychology in Rep IV. Plato can be read as intending a serious psychology by the tripartite soul and his tripartition contributes to a coherent picture of the embodied soul within and outside of the Republic; he shall appear genuinely committed to the three part soul. To this extent, I shall conclude, we have additional grounds for defending Plato’s account of the tripartite soul.

3.1 Does Plato intend a serious psychology by his account of the tripartite soul?

Plato may not appear genuinely committed to the tripartite soul, if he does not intend the three soul parts to provide a psychological explanation of human behaviour. We may determine this possibility by clarifying Socrates’s wider agenda throughout the dialogues. Namely, he is concerned with an exetazein (examination) of himself and of others (Ibid., p.123). He states the nature of his life’s mission at the Apology (Ibid., p.122), asserting that it is the greatest good for man to engage in discussion about the excellences every day, and to test himself and others (Apology, 37e-38a). We can identify Socrates’ typical dialectical method in the Apology as a way of confirming his exetazein of the convictions of his interlocutors. The general structure of this method starts with Socrates teasing out from his guest speaker a general conviction he holds, and from there on questioning him, to get him to spell out his other beliefs. The aim is to expose his interlocutor to the inconsistency in his various convictions, and convince him to jettison his original belief (Ibid., p.123). By confirming what exactly Socrates is examining for inconsistency in others through this method, we can calculate his position on what exactly is being examined for inconsistency during the process of self-examination (Ibid., p.122). When we examine ourselves and
discover an inconsistency in our own beliefs, would he explain our intellectual error as an inconsistency between our particular beliefs, or would his explanation announce the conflict between the three parts of our soul?

For instance, in the *Apology*, examining others involves searching for an inconsistency in their belief sets (Ibid.). At 24d, Socrates draws out his principal accuser’s conviction that what make the youth of Athens turn out to be good men are the laws. He then extracts from Meletus those other things which he is convinced of. At 25a, Socrates prompts Meletus to confirm that all Athenians, with the exception of Socrates himself, make the youth noble and good. By yielding from him accuser the conviction that just about anyone can improve these young men, Socrates is trying to persuade Meletus to discard his original claim that the nation’s laws are what make people good. During his examination of others, Socrates is looking for an inconsistency in their belief sets (Rowe, op. cit., p.123). Moreover, his *exetazein* of others in the *Republic* indicates that the intellectual error of his interlocutors lies in their beliefs. For instance, during Thrasymachus’s defence of justice as the advantage of the stronger in Rep I, Socrates prompts his interlocutor’s conviction that injustice is a virtue (*Republic*, I, 348e). He then encourages Thrasymachus to agree that a bad and ignorant person wants to outdo both his like and his opposite (350b), with the aim of exposing Thrasymachus to the inconsistency in his beliefs. He agrees with Socrates that a wise person is a virtuous one, but then admits that the unjust person wants to surpass those people who possess the same skill as him. Having acknowledged that this latter desire is one which wise people do not possess (350b), Socrates is pushing Thrasymachus to admit that injustice is contrary to wisdom, and thus cannot be identified as a virtue (350c). Even in the *Republic*, the study of Socratic *exetazein* is clearly whether the guest speaker’s beliefs are consistent. From these examples, it is natural to infer that Socrates’s project of self-examination would diagnose the conflict of motivations we experience when we, say, desire and are averse to one and the same drink, as an inconsistency between our belief about what is apparently good for us to do and our belief about what is genuinely good for us to pursue (Roew, op. cit., p.173. On this analysis, our motivational conflict is explainable as intellectual failure of belief (Ibid.,p.171), rather than any discord between our soul parts. By considering Socrates’s project of self-examination in the light of his *exetazein* of others, Plato does not seem committed to providing a psychological explanation of a person’s behaviour in terms of the tripartite soul.
Still, by introducing the tripartite soul at Rep IV, Socrates intends a more accurate explanation of the actual phenomena underlying human behaviour. This depends on an observation of how non-philosophical people behave in relation to their irrational aspects (Ibid.). For instance, they lack all awareness that their basic bodily impulses can and must be kept under rational control, and are drawn to the objects which can satisfy such urges: food, drink, sex (Ibid.). They experience a conflict between bodily desires which appear good, and their rational desires which are truly good. But precisely because these appetitive pleasures are announced ‘good’ by a system of appearances (Moss, op. cit., p.528), these people do not perceive the conflict between desires which are apparently good and desires which are genuinely good. Consequently, they attribute to their appetites a power and importance which they do not have naturally, and centre their lives on satisfying these impulsive desires (Rowe, op. cit., p.171). In this scenario, we can observe such people’s appetitive parts conflicting with and preventing them from acting on their rational part’s desires. This is precisely how Socrates diagnoses Leontius’s behaviour in Rep IV. When he becomes outraged at his own eyes, for gorging over the dead corpses (439e-440a), he is expressing a conflict between his spirit’s aversion and his appetite’s desire to look at the dead bodies. His spirit may become angry with his appetitive self- but his actions are nonetheless determined by the latter part (Rowe, op. cit.). We can infer that Socrates’s explanation of irrational behaviour trades on a picture of the soul that consists of reasoning, appetitive and spirited parts, rather than any picture of an intellectual failure in his belief system. The three parts clearly explain the genuine internal conflict within someone who acts against his better judgement; to this extent, we can infer that Plato is truly committed to the three-part soul.

3.2 Is the tripartite soul consistent with Plato’s wider conception of the soul?

A second way of discovering whether Plato is truly committed to the tripartite soul is by considering whether this account proves consistent with his wider conception of the soul, both in the dialogues surrounding the Republic, and within the Republic itself. We may determine this possibility by examining the soul’s immortality, given that the souls target to depart from the body and return to the world of the Forms, is a topic that runs through Plato’s wider discussion of the soul in the middle dialogues.

For instance, the Phaedrus presents the immortality of the embodied soul as depending on the unity of its parts. Socrates’s chariot allegory presents a charioteer and his
two steeds as an analogy of the tripartite soul (Phaedrus, 246a). The charioteer, driver of the two horses, mirrors reason as an enforcer of spirit’s alliance to its authority (Republic, IV, 441e), and a regulator of the appetitive desires in the soul (442a). One of the steeds is a noble breed, which Plato assimilates to the spirited soul part. The other steed is of ignoble breed, resembling the irrational, unruly appetitive soul part (Phaedrus, 246a-b). Socrates contrasts an immortal soul that is winged, which controls the world from the heavenly realm (246b), with this composite of charioteer and steeds. By losing their wings, the horses drag the charioteer down to earth, and this composite receives a mortal frame (246c). Nonetheless, Socrates describes the process by which the soul can retain its immortal condition. Stating that it takes ten thousand years for a soul to grow back its wings, only when the embodied soul has lead a philosophical life, can it return to the immortal realm from which it fell (248e-249a). It is natural to read this soul’s disinterest with humanly concerns (249d) and sincere practise of philosophy (249a) as involving the submission of its desires associated with pursuing and regulating bodily appetites, to its rational pursuit of knowledge. Phaedrus’s account of the soul’s immortality clearly trades on Rep IV’s picture of the harmoniously conditioned three-part soul, where spirit allies with, and appetite is regulated by, reason (Republic, IV, 441e-442b). We can recognise Plato’s tripartite soul in this picture of the immortal soul at the Phaedrus. To this extent, Plato appears committed to the tripartite soul.

Similarly, Plato’s discussion of the soul’s immortality at the Phaedo requires the unity of its parts. When an embodied soul has practised philosophy, it becomes pure, and can thus reach the immortal realm (Phaedo, 67b-d). This embodied soul refuses to pursue those bodily desires which are not necessary for the body’s survival (64d-e). Instead, it leads a life according to reason (65d), through which it contemplates the true, divine forms which are characteristic of the immortal realm. The soul’s nature resembles the immortal place it contemplates; consequently, it can reach this realm once it departs from the body (67b-d). A picture of the composite soul emerges: the desires for bodily pleasures and associated desires to regulate the satisfaction of these pleasures, must submit to reason’s pursuit of knowledge about the truths associated with the world of the Forms. The soul’s immortality as portrayed in the Phaedo clearly requires the unity of the soul’s three parts which correspond to these different types of desire. This trades on the tripartite soul at Rep IV, where appetite’s desire for bodily pleasures, and spirit’s regulation of the appetites which we set out to satisfy, cooperate under reason’s rule (Republic, IV, 441e-442b). Plato’s theory of tripartition clearly contributes to a picture of the immortal soul which emerges from this dialogue post-dating the Republic.
Moreover, discussion of the soul’s immortality within the *Republic* itself requires a fundamental harmony between the soul parts. At Rep X, Socrates asserts: it is not easy for a thing composed of various parts to be immortal, if it has not been assembled in the finest way. This is, however, the condition of the soul in its embodied state (*Republic, X, 611b*), which he compares to the condition of the sea god Glauce – whose primary nature is not easily detected by onlookers. Just as parts of his body have been broken off, crushed and disfigured by the waves and by the shells, seaweed and stones which have become attached to him (611d), so the true nature of the soul has become distorted by the appetite and spirited desires which distract it from the pursuit of knowledge in its embodied condition. To discover its true essence, Socrates suggests that Glaucon and him must examine the soul’s love of wisdom, where its desire to learn about the true forms make it akin to the immortal realm (611e). The soul’s pursuit of knowledge is best spelled out by the description of philosophers at Rep VI. When their souls desire to learn the truths associated with wisdom, they abstain from bodily pleasures (*Republic, VI, 485d*). These souls are thus able to reach a pure, immortal state by submitting their physical desires to reason’s pursuit of wisdom. The embodied soul’s target for immortality requires a basic unity between spirit and appetite, which form desires associated with the physical realm, and reason, which desires knowledge of the true good. This account of the embodied soul in the *Republic’s* later books clearly mirrors Rep IV’s picture of the appetite and spirited parts, which must submit to reason’s pursuit of knowledge of the true good, if the soul is to develop those excellences of wisdom, justice and the like (443d-e) - that are associated with the immortal realm.

We may also determine whether Rep IV’s tripartition coheres with Plato’s wider discussion of the soul, by observing the account of justice in the soul it offers, at later points in the *Republic*. For instance, the process of educating the embodied soul throughout the *Republic* confirms the tripartite soul’s picture of justice, as the basic harmony between its parts. At Rep VII, Socrates compares an eye that cannot be turned around from darkness into light without turning the whole body, to the instrument by which the soul learns. This tool cannot educate the part which loves wisdom, without educating the whole soul (*Republic, VII, 518c*). It is natural to read this as including the part which desires bodily pleasures, as well as the part concerned with regulating the soul’s pursuit of these pleasures. This clearly requires a basic co-operation between the spirited and appetitive parts to learn from reason’s calculations. Arguably, this process of education confirms Rep IV’s amalgam of the soul, whose just nature requires the three parts co-operating harmoniously (*Republic, IV, 443d*)
under reason’s rule. Similarly, the unjust man at Rep IX provides a pictorial summary of what has been understood about justice by the tripartite soul in Rep IV. When he is caught for his acts of injustice, this man’s brutish part is tamed, and his gentle part freed, so that his whole soul reaches its best nature (Republic, IX, 591b). The former is an image of the soul’s appetitive part, while the latter depicts its reasoning part. When the first is calmed and the second is released, they become harmonised, and the unjust man can acquire justice. This picture of co-ordinating two of his three parts clearly reflects Rep IV’s picture of the just soul; harmony is required between the reasoning, appetitive and spirited parts for the soul to become entirely one, through which it can acquire a just nature (Republic IV, 443d-e). It is reasonable to infer that Republic IV’s tripartite soul coheres with Plato’s wider discussion of the soul, given that the account of justice in the soul that it prescribes runs through the later books of the Republic.

3.3 - A conclusion

A demonstration of Plato’s genuine commitment to the tripartite soul provides us with additional grounds to defend his case for the tripartite soul. This becomes clear once we reveal that he intends a serious psychology by the tripartite soul. Clearly, Rep IV’s account of the soul more accurately explains irrational behaviour, than Plato’s pre-Republic explanation of the intellectual failure in our beliefs. To this extent, we can confirm that Plato does intend a serious psychology by his tripartition of the soul. What is more, we can affirm this commitment to the three-part soul by revealing its coherence with Plato wider discussion of the soul. Illustrations of the soul’s immortality both in the Phaedrus and Phaedo require the fundamental unity of the soul’s parts, which clearly trade on the picture of internal harmony characteristic of Rep IV’s tripartite soul. Meanwhile, images of the soul in the Republic’s later books VI, VII and IX refer back to the account of justice offered by the tripartite soul; confirming Plato’s psychological explanation of human behaviour in Rep IV. Clearly, the three-part soul coheres with the wider discussions of the soul both throughout the other middle dialogues and within the Republic itself. His genuine commitment to tripartition provides us with additional grounds for defending this account of the tripartite soul.

4 Conclusion

While we may secure Plato’s case for the tripartite soul from different angles, in the introduction I noted that it is fundamentally important to demonstrate this account’s internal consistency. To this end, I embarked on the interpretive task of yielding the most plausible
interpretations of the arguments which I understood to establish the reasoning, appetitive and spirited soul parts.

In the first chapter, I set out the first tripartition argument in premise form, namely, the demarcation of reason from appetite. While an exhaustive examination of this argument could have assessed each of the eleven premises, I was struck by the necessity to establish the first premise, namely, the ‘P of O’, so that the thirsty man’s pair of conflicting desires at premise eight can qualify as a case of psychological conflict. We can achieve this by discerning the relevant sense of a notion that is central to this principle, namely, opposition. This involves both pinpointing the correct meaning of a phrase within the ‘P of O’ - whose various interpretations in English bare a slightly different sense of opposition (Stalley, op. cit., p.113) - and discerning whether the principle should accommodate the qualification of opposition that Plato specifies outside of the Republic.

Although the ‘P of O’ is thus established, there remain rival interpretations of the nature of the conflicting desires that the principle picks out. We must adopt Moss’ would-be analysis of each of the conflicting desires as a representational statement that is arrived at by a distinct source of evaluation, if these desires are to be suitably conflicted, and able to instantiate the ‘P of O’. Only then can the inference to the reasoning and appetitive parts which correspond to these desires, run through.

Even the interpretation of these desires that best fits this argument, faces a tension concerning its psychological plausibility. But this tension is resolvable once we emphasise that the case of motivational conflict that is relevant to the argument, requires each the reasoning and appetitive parts to house these conflicting desires. We can thus defend the characterisation of the conflicting desires so that they instantiate the ‘P of O’, and thus allow the inference to the reasoning and appetitive soul parts which correspond to these desires, to run through. To this extent, we can hold that the most plausible interpretation of this argument successfully distinguishes reason from appetite.

To fully demonstrate the tripartite soul’s internal consistency, I advanced the second and third tripartition arguments which each contribute to identifying spirit a third soul part. The second tripartition argument purports to show that spirit and appetite do not share an identical nature, from which it concludes that spirit and appetite are not the same thing. The third tripartition argument trades on the demonstration of spirit as having a different nature from reason; concluding that spirit and reason are not the same thing.
Despite establishing the second and third tripartition arguments, we must characterise spirit so that it allows Plato’s inference from the conclusions of these arguments, to spirit as a third soul part, to run through. This can be achieved by interpreting spirit as a motivational source arrived at by a system of evaluation that is distinct from reason and appetite. But this characterisation of spirit faces tension regarding its psychological explanation of spirited young children. Still, we can resolve this tension by disclosing their behaviour as an early stage manifestation of this motivational source. On this basis, we can defend the inference of spirit as a third soul part, from the conclusions of these two tripartition arguments.

By characterising reason, appetite and spirit as distinct sources of motivation in the soul in a way that fits with the three tripartition arguments, we can secure Plato’s case for the tripartite soul, on the grounds that it is internally consistent. As I noted in the introduction, with tripartition well established, this leads us to consider whether we can further secure Plato’s case for tripartition, through demonstrating him as being genuinely committed to this account of the soul. In the third chapter, I took this demonstration to involve portraying Plato as intending a serious psychology by the tripartite soul. This intention becomes clear once we observe Socrates discarding his pre-Republic explanation of irrational behaviour as an intellectual failure of belief (Rowe, op. cit., p. 171), in favour of a more accurate picture of the genuine internal conflict between a person’s soul parts. Meanwhile, revealing the coherence of tripartition with Plato’s wider discussion of the soul further confirms his commitment to the three-part soul. Both discussions of the immortal soul in dialogues post-dating the Republic, and pictorial summaries of the just soul in the later books of the Republic itself, trade on the tripartite soul’s picture of the fundamental harmony between soul parts.

The verdict I reach is thus a philosophically compelling one. We can successfully tease out reason, appetite and spirit as three distinct motivational sources by a close examination of the arguments for these parts at Rep IV. We can appreciate the psychological explanation of irrational behaviour that the three-part soul provides. We can also observe the tripartite soul both throughout the Republic, and within the other middle dialogues. Plato’s theory of the tripartite soul can thus be ascribed interpretive and philosophical merit. To this extent, I conclude that we can secure Plato’s case for the tripartite soul.

List of Abbreviations

‘P of O’ Principle of Opposites
Rep I Republic book 1
Rep IV  Republic book 4
Rep VI  Republic book 6
Rep VII Republic book 7
Rep IX  Republic book 9
Rep X   Republic book 10

**Bibliography**


